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ABSTRACT
Mobile devices store a diverse set of private user data and
have gradually become a hub to control users’ other per-
sonal Internet-of-Things devices. Access control on mobile
devices is therefore highly important. The widely accepted
solution is to protect access by asking for a password. How-
ever, password authentication is tedious, e.g., a user needs
to input a password every time she wants to use the device.
Moreover, existing biometrics such as face, fingerprint, and
touch behaviors are vulnerable to forgery attacks.
We propose a new touch-based biometric authentication
system that is passive and secure against forgery attacks. In
our touch-based authentication, a user’s touch behaviors are
a function of some random “secret”. The user can subcon-
sciously know the secret while touching the device’s screen.
However, an attacker cannot know the secret at the time
of attack, which makes it challenging to perform forgery at-
tacks even if the attacker has already obtained the user’s
touch behaviors. We evaluate our touch-based authentica-
tion system by collecting data from 25 subjects. Results are
promising: the random secrets do not influence user experi-
ence and, for targeted forgery attacks, our system achieves
0.18 smaller Equal Error Rates (EERs) than previous touch-
based authentication.
CCS Concepts
•Security and privacy → Authentication; Biometrics;
Keywords
touch biometrics; mobile authentication; forgery-resistant
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1. INTRODUCTION
Since the introduction of the first iPhone by Apple in June
2007, touch based mobile devices have become ubiquitous.
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For instance, the volume of the smartphone market has al-
ready surpassed that of the PC market in 2011 [23]. Users of-
ten store a large amount of sensitive data on mobile devices.
Moreover, with the advent of Internet-of-Things (IoT) de-
vices such as smartwatches, fitness trackers, the Nest Ther-
mostat [14], and medical devices like Bee [3], smartphones
have gradually become the hub of IoT. Specifically, a user
could use a smartphone to control her smartwatch, adjust
home temperature via remotely controlling the Nest Ther-
mostat, and view the user’s insulin injection data and glu-
cose levels from Bee. Access control on mobile devices is
important because having access to a user’s mobile device
allows an attacker to 1) access the user’s personal data, and
2) control the user’s other connected IoT devices and access
sensitive data on them. For instance, an attacker that ob-
tains access to a smartphone can access the user’s sensitive
SMS messages, emails, and apps, as well as manipulate the
user’s home temperature by remotely controlling the con-
nected Nest Thermostat.
The most popular method to address such threats is to
authenticate a user via password before allowing her to use
the device, i.e., the user logs in the device with a correct
password. However, users might turn off password authen-
tication because it is tedious and inconvenient [5, 10, 21].
For instance, Egelman et al. [10] showed that 42% of users
do not lock their smartphones, and 34% of them do so be-
cause locking is “too much of a hassle”. Moreover, it is well
known that conventional biometrics such as face, fingerprint,
and voice are vulnerable to forgery attacks [1, 2, 11]. For
instance, fingerprint readers can be tricked by taking an im-
age of the fingerprint, forming a mold, and using wood glue
to make a fake finger [11]. Therefore, it is urgent to design
secure and usable authentication methods.
A number of recent studies have raised the possibility of
using low level interactions such as how a user touches the
screen as a biometric signature for authentication in mobile
devices [4, 9, 12, 13, 17]. The key idea for such authenti-
cation mechanisms is that users produce touch data all the
time when using the device so that authentication can be
passive, i.e., without requiring the user to carry out any ac-
tion dedicated to authentication.
However, this touch-based authentication mechanism, like
conventional biometrics, is also vulnerable to forgery at-
tacks. For instance, an attacker (e.g., a ‘friend’ or the spouse
of the targeted user) can collect the targeted user’s touch
data via convincing her to use the attacker’s mobile devices
and recording her touch data. Later, the attacker can pro-
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Figure 1: Concepts of stability and sensitivity.
gram a Lego robot to replay the collected touch data on the
targeted mobile device, which can compromise the authen-
tication system with a high probability [19].
Our work: In this work, we demonstrate a defense against
forgery attacks to touch-based biometrics. In particular, we
defend against forgery attacks by leveraging the impact of
screen settings (serving as a random “secret”) on a user’s
touch behavior. The sensors on the screen of a mobile device
record where, when, how fast, and how heavily a user’s fin-
ger touches the screen. Before the recorded raw data is sent
to applications on the mobile device, our approach trans-
forms the data as it passes through the operating system
according to a screen setting. For instance, a screen setting
of 0.8 horizontal distortion means that a 1.0cm long hor-
izontal line starting at a certain location on the screen is
received by the application as a 0.8cm long horizontal line
starting at the same location. Due to such modifications,
the running applications react differently to the actions of
the user. As a consequence, the user will adapt her touch
behavior (i.e., raw touch data recorded by screen sensors)
in order to achieve the desired application behavior. Ide-
ally, the adaptation is performed subconsciously, i.e., the
user does not explicitly notice that the screen settings have
changed but still adapts the touch behavior to compensate
for this change. We investigate the impact of screen settings
on a user’s touch behavior and their applications to defend
against forgery attacks.
First, we find that, when screen settings are discretized
properly, a user’s touch behavior in two different screen set-
tings is stable, meaning that the behavior difference between
two different users in the same setting is larger than that
between two different settings for the same user. Stability
guarantees that we can distinguish a user’s touch behavior
from other users’. Unfortunately, stability implies that if we
learn a model to distinguish a user’s touch behavior from
other users’ using only a single setting, then forgery attacks
that replay the targeted user’s data collected in other set-
tings succeed with a high probability. Extending stability,
we find that a user’s touch behavior in different screen set-
tings is also sensitive, meaning that they have a high degree
of separability in the feature space. Sensitivity guarantees
that one can learn a model to distinguish touch behavior of
a user in two different screen settings, serving as a basis for
a sufficient defense against forgery attacks. Figure 1 shows
the concepts of stability and sensitivity.
Second, based on our findings, we propose a novel contin-
uous authentication mechanism called adaptive touch-based
continuous authentication. Our system consists of a registra-
tion phase and an authentication phase. In the registration
phase, we sample a set of screen settings in which a user’s
touch behavior is both stable and sensitive. Then we train
a model for each setting s to distinguish the behavior of the
user in s from the behavior of the same user in other set-
tings and those of other users in all considered settings. In
the authentication phase, we randomly sample a predefined
setting and use the corresponding model to continuously au-
thenticate the user in each time interval. Our authentica-
tion system can significantly decrease the success rate of an
attacker who knows the targeted user’s touch data in all
settings. This is because the attacker cannot know the set-
ting used by our system at the time of attacks and replaying
touch data collected in a different setting fails to pass the
authentication with high probability.
Third, we evaluate our system via collecting data from
25 subjects in five different settings along the X axis and
five different settings along the Y axis. We find that users
can subconsciously adapt their touch behavior to different
screen settings, i.e., the transitions between two settings do
not interrupt users nor affect user experiences. Moreover,
our system achieves 0.02 to 0.09 smaller mean Equal Er-
ror Rates (EER) than previous work for random forgery at-
tacks and 0.17 to 0.18 smaller mean EERs than previous
work for targeted forgery attacks; the registration phase of
our authentication system takes a short period of time, i.e.,
touch data collected within two minutes are enough to train
a model for a setting; and our system achieves smaller EERs
with more screen settings.
In summary, our key contributions are as follows:
• We demonstrate the stability and sensitivity of touch
behavior to screen settings.
• We propose a new touch-based continuous authenti-
cation mechanism, which builds on the stability and
sensitivity properties of behavioral touch patterns to
achieve forgery-resistant touch signatures.
• We evaluate our authentication system via collecting
touch data from 25 subjects in five screen settings along
the X axis and five screen settings along the Y axis. We
demonstrate that our system significantly outperforms
previous work at defending against forgery attacks.
2. BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK
Screen settings: Users interact with a mobile device via
swiping, clicking, or zooming on the screen. For instance,
users often slide over the screen horizontally (e.g., navi-
gate to the next page of icons in the main screen or browse
through photos) and vertically (e.g., read webpages, social
media updates, or emails), which result in horizontal swipes
and vertical swipes, respectively. A swipe is also called a
stroke, and we will use them interchangeably in the paper.
The sensors on the screen record the location, timing,
pressure, and covering area of interactions. More specifi-
cally, an interaction is a sequence of touch points (ti,xi,yi,pi,ai),
where ti is the timestamp, xi is the horizontal location, yi is
the vertical location, pi is the pressure, and ai is the cover-
ing area of the ith touch point. Then these touch points are
transformed by the operating system to higher-level primi-
tives such as clicks, swipes, and zooms. Applications on the
mobile device access the transformed primitives through the
operating system. In the following, touch behavior refers to
the raw touch data recorded by the screen sensors.
A screen setting controls how the sensed raw data is trans-
formed to the primitives that are used by applications. For
instance, screen settings can independently distort the X
(i.e., horizontal) axis or the Y (i.e., vertical) axis. Note that
transformation is only applied to a sequence of touch points
and the first touch point of any interaction is not trans-
formed. Therefore, one-touch operations like clicking a but-
ton on an application will not be affected by different screen
settings. Moreover, since screen settings are transparent to
applications, application developers do not need to change
their applications when the screen settings are modified.
Suppose a user draws a line from position (10,10) to po-
sition (110,110) on the screen. Under a screen setting of 0.8
Y-distortion the application would see a line from position
(10,10) to position (110,90). Under a screen setting of 1.2
X-distortion the application would see a line from position
(10, 10) to position (130, 110). To account for such transfor-
mations, the user will adapt her touch behavior to achieve
the desired application behavior.
Touch-based continuous authentication: Touch-based
authentication has been proposed first in [9] and [16]. How-
ever, both methods require the user to carry out a specific se-
cret gesture at a defined point of time (unlock challenge) and
then analyze how the gesture is carried out. More recently,
leveraging a user’s touch interactions obtained when the user
interacts with the device to continuously and implicitly mon-
itor the user has attracted increasing attentions. Complex
interactions such as zooming are too infrequently used to be
appropriate for continuous monitoring and clicks exhibit too
few features to be discriminative for users. Therefore, most
previous work focus on swiping interactions (i.e., strokes),
which were demonstrated to contain a behavioral biometric
signature that may be used to continuously authenticate the
user [4, 12, 13, 17, 20].
For instance, Frank et al. [12] extracted 31 features from
each stroke and trained a classifier for a user to distinguish
her touch behavior from other users’. These features in-
clude the direction of the end-to-end line, average velocity,
start locations, and end locations of a stroke. For a com-
plete list of the features, please refer to Frank et al. [12].
More recently, Sae-Bae et al. [18] studied a canonical set of
22 multitouch gestures for authentication on mobile devices,
and they found a desirable alignment of usability and secu-
rity, i.e., gestures that are more secure are rated by users
as more usable. Sherman et al. [20] proposed to use free
gestures as a static authenticator to unlock mobile devices
and they further studied the memorability of user generated
gestures. Xu et al. [24] verified that touch-based authentica-
tion is a promising authenticator via conducting experiments
with around 30 users for one month in the wild.
However, all these touch-based authentication mechanisms
consider a single universal screen setting (e.g., the default
screen setting) for all users, making them vulnerable to forgery
attacks which collect a user’s touch strokes in the screen set-
ting and program a robot to replay them to attack the au-
thentication system (please see more details in Section 6).
Our work also focuses on users’ strokes, but we leverage
multiple, randomly chosen screen settings.
Common-behavior attacks: Serwadda and Phoha [19]
showed that a Lego robot can be programmed to swipe the
screen of a mobile device, and the stroke recorded by the
screen sensors is as desired. The attacker needs to know the
defining parameters (e.g., start and stop locations) of the
stroke that is to be forged.
Moreover, they proposed that the attacker can simply pro-
gram the robot to replay the common touch behavior of a
large population onto the targeted user’s mobile device, and
they showed that such common-behavior attacks can signif-
icantly increase the EERs. However, they also showed that
their common-behavior attacks have limited success rates for
users whose behaviors are relatively far from the common,
and there are about 20-40% of such users. This means that
touch-based authentication is appropriate to these users. In
practice, touch-based authentication systems can compare
a user’s touch behavior to those of a large population and
recommend if the behavior is far enough from the common
behaviors so that it is resilient to common-behavior attacks.
In this work, we consider stronger forgery attacks in which
the attacker could obtain the targeted user’s touch data.
3. THREAT MODEL
The authentication system is available to the attacker.
The attacker can read and analyze the implementation de-
tails of the authentication system offline. Therefore, if the
authentication system uses a universal screen setting (e.g.,
the default screen setting) for all users, the attacker can
obtain this setting via offline code analysis. However, we
assume that the attacker cannot obtain the dynamic behav-
iors of the authentication system that runs on the targeted
user’s mobile device. For instance, the attacker cannot know
the current setting used by the authentication system if it
is randomly sampled in random time intervals. This is be-
cause reading out the current settings at runtime requires
high privileges (e.g., root access to the operating system)
and an attacker that has already obtained such high privi-
leges already compromised the system.
We assume the attacker has a commercialized programmable
robot (e.g., a Lego robot), which can be used to forge touch
strokes and play them on mobile devices. For instance, Ser-
wadda and Phoha [19] showed how to program a Lego robot
to forge touch strokes to have desired features. We note that
an intelligent robot which is equipped with specialized sen-
sors could potentially detect the current screen setting used
by our authentication system using advanced computer vi-
sion algorithms. However, the attacker might not have such
a specialized robot, and thus, in this work, we consider state-
of-the-art commercialized robots, with which the attacker
cannot infer the current screen setting.
We consider two general forgery attacks depending on
whether the attacker obtains touch strokes of the targeted
user or not. We will discuss more advanced targeted attacks
such as training a human attacker in Section 7.
Random attacks: In this scenario, the attacker does not
obtain touch strokes of the targeted user. For instance, this
could be the case in which the targeted user lost the device
and it is found by a random attacker, who does not know the
targeted user and does not have its touch strokes. However,
the attacker could obtain touch strokes of a set of other
users. This is reasonable because 1) the attacker can retrieve
touch strokes from publicly accessible data sets [12, 19], and
2) it is possible that users (intentionally or unintentionally)
install an application (e.g., this application is a fun game
application and does not appear to be malicious) that is
developed by the attacker on their mobile devices and the
application records users’ touch strokes.
After obtaining touch strokes from a set of users in dif-
ferent screen settings, the attacker randomly selects touch
strokes, programs a Lego robot to forge them [19], and uses
the programmed robot to touch the mobile device.
(a) User A, 0.8 Y-
distortion
(b) User B, 0.8 Y-
distortion
(c) User C, 0.8 Y-
distortion
(d) User A, 1.2 Y-
distortion
(e) User B, 1.2 Y-
distortion
(f) User C, 1.2 Y-
distortion
Figure 2: Vertical strokes of three users A, B, and C in two screen settings, which we obtained in our experiments. The
black background simulates the mobile device’s screen while the lines are users’ touch strokes. We observe that users’ touch
behaviors are stable, i.e., the touch behaviors of a user in one setting are closer to those of the user in another setting than
those of other users.
Targeted attacks: In this case, the attacker obtains touch
strokes of the targeted user. For instance, the attacker could
be a “friend” of the targeted user or the targeted user’s cu-
rious spouse, who wants to access the messages sent by the
targeted user or know whom the targeted user has called,
and the attacker convinces the targeted user to use his/her
mobile devices to record the targeted user’s touch strokes.
Again, the attacker programs a robot using the collected
strokes to attack the targeted user. Intuitively, if the authen-
tication system uses an universal screen setting, the attacker
can obtain the targeted user’s strokes in this universal set-
ting, which results in attacks with very high success rates
(see Section 6). Our new authentication mechanism uses
multiple screen settings in which a user’s touch behavior is
different, and we randomly sample one of the screen settings
in each time interval. Given enough settings, our system can
significantly decrease the success rates of targeted attacks
even if the attacker obtains the targeted user’s touch strokes
in all screen settings. This is because the attacker cannot
know the screen setting used by our authentication system
at the time of attack, and thus the attacker does not know
which strokes should be used to program the robot. There-
fore, the attack is reduced to randomly guessing a setting s,
but replaying strokes collected in s passes the authentication
with much lower probabilities if s is not the current setting
used by our authentication system. We note that we do not
consider attacks with advanced robots to automatically infer
the screen setting in this work.
4. STABILITY AND SENSITIVITY
Before introducing our adaptive touch-based continuous
authentication system, we introduce two key observations
that inspire the design of our authentication system.
Stability and sensitivity: A user’s touch behaviors in two
screen settings are said to be stable if the touch behaviors
of the user in one setting are closer to those of the user in
the other setting than those of other users in both settings.
Moreover, a user’s touch behaviors in two settings are said to
be sensitive if they have a high degree of separability in the
feature space. Figure 1 illustrates the possible outcomes for
two settings sa and sb. Intuitively, a user’s touch behaviors
in two settings become more stable and less sensitive when
the two settings are closer.
We find that there exists screen settings across which a
user’s touch behaviors are both stable and sensitive. For
instance, in our experiments (see Section 6), two of the
screen settings we consider are 0.8 Y-distortion and 1.2 Y-
distortion, respectively. Figure 2 shows vertical touch strokes
of three users in the two settings; it is visually noticeable
that their behaviors are stable.
Note that a vertical stroke could be an up stroke or a down
stroke, which corresponds to scrolling up or scrolling down,
respectively. Figure 3 contrasts the start locations (i.e., start
y) and stop locations (i.e., stop y) in the vertical direction
(i.e., Y axis) of up strokes. We find that their touch behavior
are also sensitive. User A (or B) starts touch strokes at
similarly low y locations in both settings. However, in the
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Figure 3: Start locations vs. stop locations in the vertical direction of up strokes in two screen settings of the three users.
We find that their touch behaviors are also sensitive, i.e., a user’s touch strokes in different settings have a high degree of
separability in the feature space.
screen setting of 0.8 Y-distortion, the strokes interpreted by
the application are shorter than the strokes inputed by the
user on the screen, and thus the user automatically stops the
touch strokes at higher (i.e., larger) y locations, which makes
the strokes on the screen longer. User C might subliminally
notice the different screen settings, and she tends to start
and stop the touch strokes at higher y locations with 0.8
Y-distortion.
Implications: On one hand, stability implies that models
trained in any setting of one user will always be distinguish-
able from models trained for other users, clearly separating
individual users with high probabilities. This property is
needed to successfully authenticate a specific user. On the
other hand, if we learn a model to distinguish a user’s touch
behaviors from other users’ in a single setting, then forgery
attacks that replay the targeted user’s strokes collected in
other settings can still succeed with high probabilities.
Sensitivity implies that we can train a model to distinguish
a single user’s touch behaviors in one setting from those in
other settings, which makes it possible to defend against tar-
geted attacks. Specifically, when our authentication system
uses a setting s, the attacker would fail to pass the authen-
tication with much higher probability if the attacker forges
attacks using the targeted user’s strokes collected in settings
other than s.
5. ADAPTIVE AUTHENTICATION
Our touch-based authentication system consists of two
phases: the registration phase and the authentication phase.
The authentication system learns user characteristics during
the registration phase and enforces these learned character-
istics during the authentication phase.
5.1 Registration phase
Figure 4 illustrates the registration phase. Suppose u is a
new user. First, we sample n screen settings across which u’s
touch behaviors are both stable and sensitive. In practice,
we can evenly divide the range of possible screen settings
into m bins, and choose the centers of the n bins that are
randomly sampled. We denote the set of sampled settings
as S(u).
We distinguish two types of strokes: horizontal and verti-
cal, which correspond to scrolling horizontally and scrolling
Features
Models2
1
User Server
Figure 4: Registration phase.
vertically, respectively. The two types of strokes have dif-
ferent features, e.g., the directions of the end-to-end lines
corresponding to the strokes. This categorization could en-
able us to enhance the performance of the system. For each
setting s ∈ S(u), we collect a set of touch strokes for each
type t (denoted as T (u, s, t)) from u via fixing the screen
setting to be s. Then we extract a set of features from each
stroke. We adopt the features that are proposed by Frank
et al. [12]. The extracted features are subsequently sent to
the server. We send features to the server instead of the
raw strokes to mitigate the loss from a server compromise.
In particular, if we send raw strokes to the server and it
is compromised, the raw strokes are easily available to at-
tackers. This is similar to the scenario where passwords are
available to attackers when a password database is compro-
mised [15, 8]. However, even if the server is compromised
and the features are available to attackers, it is unclear how
to forge touch strokes that have these features.
Second, we leverage machine learning techniques to train
a classifier for each setting and each stroke type. Specifi-
cally, for each setting s ∈ S(u) and a stroke type t, we take
the features of the corresponding strokes collected in the set-
ting s (i.e., T (u, s, t)) as positive examples, and features of
type-t strokes collected in all other settings (i.e., T (u, s′, t)
for all s′ ∈ S(u) − {s}) and features of type-t strokes of all
users that have already adopted the system as negative ex-
amples. Then we learn a classifier c(u, s, t) to distinguish
these positive and negative examples. Therefore, we obtain
2n classifiers for the user. The model parameters of these
classifiers are then sent back to the user.
Table 1: Notations of the five screen settings, which are
distortions along either the X axis or the Y axis.
sa sb sc sd se
0.8 0.9 1.0 1.1 1.2
5.2 Authentication phase
Our adaptive continuous authentication method works on
discrete time intervals. In each time interval, we sample a
setting s from S(u) uniformly at random and change the
screen setting to be s. If the user inputs a stroke with type
t, we authenticate the stroke using the classifier c(u, s, t).
Intuitively, our authentication method can significantly
decrease the success rates of targeted attacks. In the worst
case, the attacker obtains a set of touch strokes of the user
in all settings in S(u) and can replay these touch strokes
via programming a robot. However, the attacker cannot
know which setting is randomly sampled in a given time
interval, and thus the attack is reduced to randomly guess
a setting and program a robot to replay strokes collected in
the setting. Due to the sensitivity of users’ touch behaviors,
these forged strokes will be rejected with high probabilities.
Note that previous work [12, 13] uses a fixed universal
setting for all users, and thus their authentication systems
can be breached if the attacker obtains the targeted user’s
touch strokes in this hard-coded setting. Moreover, we show
(in Section 6) that even replaying the touch strokes of the
targeted user collected in a different setting can still breach
their authentication system with high success rates because
of the stability of users’ touch behaviors.
A user’s behavior is relatively stable over time. For in-
stance, Frank et al. [12] showed that the median EER in-
creases by only 4% when their classifiers are used one week
after the registration phase. However, in practice, to account
for behavior variety in a longer period of time, we could peri-
odically (e.g., each month or quarter) execute a registration
phase to update classifiers. This is feasible since the regis-
tration phase takes a short period of time as we will show
in our experiments.
6. EXPERIMENTS
We evaluate the security of our new touch-based authen-
tication system against forgery attacks and compare it with
previous touch-based authentication systems.
6.1 Data collection
We consider five screen settings: 0.8, 0.9, 1.0, 1.1, and 1.2
distortions along either the X or Y axis, and we denote them
as sa, sb, sc, sd, and se, respectively. Table 1 shows the no-
tations of the five screen settings. We choose these settings
because they are reasonably separable from each other so
that a user’s touch behaviors are sensitive, yet transitions
between them are still unnoticeable to users.
We aim to collect horizontal strokes and vertical strokes in
the five screen settings. Moreover, we want to study if tran-
sitions between screen settings can be performed without
users noticing them. To achieve these goals, we implemented
an Android application with two games to record users’ raw
touch data. Our application uses an Android API to config-
ure screen settings. Moreover, we implemented a library to
intercept the raw touch data. Considering user fatigue, the
ordering of the two games is shuffled uniformly at random.
(a) Task 1 (b) Task 2
Figure 5: (a) The game used in the task 1; the user must
swipe horizontally. The image itself is available under the
Creative Commons Attribution-Share Alike 3.0 license from
the Wikipedia website. (b) The game used in the task 2;
the user must swipe vertically. We produced this image and
release it under the Creative Commons Attribution Share-
Alike 3.0 license.
Table 2: The number of strokes per subject and per second
in the five screen settings for the 25 subjects.
Strokes per subject Strokes per second
sa sb sc sd se sa sb sc sd se
Horizontal 51 52 48 49 52 0.35 0.30 0.19 0.17 0.17
Vertical 83 77 74 78 75 0.71 0.47 0.31 0.30 0.27
Task 1, horizontal strokes: In the first game the user
must identify differences between two images. The applica-
tion shows two versions of one image in a horizontal gallery
with a black image in between. The user must swipe hori-
zontally between the images. Figure 5a shows a screenshot
of this game. We shuffle the five screen settings along the
X axis at the beginning of the game, and change a setting
every 30s.
Task 2, vertical strokes: In the second game the user
must identify pairs of images. The application shows five
(statically pre-shuffled) pairs of vertically aligned images of
different patterns, shapes, and colors. At one given time
only one image is visible and the user must move the screen
to other images along the Y axis. The static shuffling allows
us to compare the same task across different users. Figure 5b
shows a screenshot of this game. We shuffle the five screen
settings along the Y axis at the beginning of the game, and
change a setting every 30s.
We used a HTC One smartphone to collect data from 25
subjects. These subjects age between 25 and 35; and 11 of
them are female. Table 2 summarizes our dataset.
Smooth transition between screen settings: Our au-
thentication system automatically transits from one setting
to another in different time intervals. One natural ques-
tion is that if users notice such transitions. To answer this
question, we ask each subject the question “Did you notice
anything abnormal?” when he/she finishes the tasks.
We find that no subject noticed these transitions, which
means that users subconsciously adapt their behavior to dif-
ferent screen settings and transitions between settings do not
interrupt users nor influence user experiences.
Table 3: Approaches we compare.
Notation Description
C-Baseline-x Baseline classifier only using touch strokes in the setting sx, where x ∈ {a, b, c, d, e}
C-ATCA-x Our classifier for the setting sx, where x ∈ {a, b, c, d, e}; strokes in other settings are also used
S-Baseline-x Baseline authentication system using C-Baseline-x with the fixed universal setting sx, where x ∈ {a, b, c, d, e}
S-Baseline-improved Our improved Baseline authentication system whose setting is randomly selected
S-ATCA
Our authentication system using C-ATCA-x, where x ∈ {a, b, c, d, e};
settings are randomly selected in each time interval
6.2 Experimental setups
We evaluate both random attacks (RA) and targeted at-
tacks (TA) against previous approaches [12, 13, 19] and ours;
we explore the impact of the number of screen settings on
the performance of our approach; and we study the time
required to collect training strokes in the registration phase.
6.2.1 Compared approaches
We distinguish classifiers and authentication systems. Clas-
sifiers are key components of a touch-based authentication
system, but an authentication system also requires to con-
sider screen settings. We name approaches to train classi-
fiers with a prefix ’C’ and approaches to implement authen-
tication systems with a prefix ’S’. Table 3 summarizes the
approaches we compare.
Classifiers: We compare the following classifiers:
• C-Baseline [12, 13, 19]: This approach considers
one setting. To train a classifier for a user u, they take
the touch strokes of u in a setting as positive examples
and those of all other users in the same setting as neg-
ative examples. We use C-Baseline-x to denote their
approach in the setting sx, where x ∈ {a, b, c, d, e}.
• C-ATCA: Our adaptive touch-based continuous au-
thentication (ATCA) considers multiple settings when
training classifiers. Specifically, for a user u, we train
classifiers for all the five screen settings. We denote
them as C-ATCA-a, C-ATCA-b, C-ATCA-c, C-ATCA-
d, and C-ATCA-e, respectively. To train C-ATCA-x,
we take strokes of u in the setting sx as positive ex-
amples, and strokes of u in the other four settings and
strokes of other users in all the five settings as negative
examples, where x ∈ {a, b, c, d, e}.
We adopt Support Vector Machine (SVM) [7] as the clas-
sifier [7] in all compared approaches since it was shown to
perform well by previous work [12, 13].
Authentication systems: Other than using different clas-
sifiers, authentication systems might also have different ways
to use screen settings.
• S-Baseline [12, 13, 19]: Their approach uses an uni-
versal setting (e.g., the default setting of the smart-
phone system) for all users. In this case, the attacker
can obtain the universal setting, e.g., via reading the
code of the authentication system. We further use S-
Baseline-x to denote the authentication system with
the universal setting sx, where x ∈ {a, b, c, d, e}. Note
that S-Baseline-x uses the classifier C-Baseline-x.
• S-Baseline-improved: We improve S-Baseline via se-
lecting a setting from {sa, sb, sc, sd, se} uniformly at
random in the registration phase and fixing it in the
authentication phase for each user. The S-Baseline-
improved system makes the attacker unaware of the
setting used for a targeted user.
• S-ATCA: Our adaptive touch-based continuous au-
thentication (ATCA) selects a setting sx from the con-
sidered five settings uniformly at random in each time
interval and uses the classifier C-ATCA-x to authenti-
cate users, where x ∈ {a, b, c, d, e}.
6.2.2 Training and testing
We evaluate the approaches via 5-fold cross-validation.
Next, we take horizontal strokes as an example to illustrate
the details. The vertical strokes are treated in the same way.
The set of our subjects is denoted as Ud.
We evenly split horizontal strokes of each user in each set-
ting into 5 folds uniformly at random. Let F = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5}
denote the IDs of the 5 folds. Moreover, we denote by
f(u, s, i) the ith fold of horizontal strokes of the user u in
the setting s, where i ∈ F and s ∈ {sa, sb, sc, sd, se}.
For each user u, we iterate over i. For each i, we train
classifiers as follows:
Training C-Baseline classifiers: To train C-Baseline-x,
we use u’s horizontal strokes in the setting sx (i.e., ∪j∈F−{i}
f(u, sx, j) as positive examples and other users’ horizontal
strokes in the setting sx (i.e., ∪v∈Ud−{u}∪j∈F−{i}f(u, sx, j))
as negative examples, where x ∈ {a, b, c, d, e}.
Training C-ATCA classifiers: To train a C-ATCA-x
classifier, we use u’s horizontal strokes in the setting sx
(i.e., ∪j∈F−{i}f(u, sx, j)) as positive examples. However,
we treat u’s horizontal strokes in the other four settings
(i.e., ∪j∈F−{i}f(u, sy, j), where y ∈ {a, b, c, d, e}/ {x}) and
other users’ horizontal strokes in all the five settings (i.e.,
∪v∈Ud−{u} ∪j∈F−{i} f(u, sz, j), where z ∈ {a, b, c, d, e}) as
negative examples, where x ∈ {a, b, c, d, e}.
We adopt a Gaussian kernel for SVM and use the LibSVM
library [6] to learn the corresponding hyper-parameters via
grid search. Each feature is re-scaled to be between -1 and
1. Note that training features and testing features are nor-
malized separately.
Testing: In the test phase, we use u’s horizontal strokes in
a setting (i.e., f(u, sx, i)) as legitimate (or positive) exam-
ples for the classifiers trained for the same setting (i.e., C-
Baseline-x and C-ATCA-x), where x ∈ {a, b, c, d, e}. More-
over, we treat other users’ horizontal strokes in all the five
settings (i.e., ∪v∈Ud−{u}f(v, sz, i), where z ∈ {a, b, c, d, e})
as strokes to perform random attacks; and we treat the tar-
get user’s horizontal strokes in the five settings (i.e., f(u, sz, i),
where z ∈ {a, b, c, d, e}) as strokes to perform targeted at-
tacks. For each user, training and testing are performed with
5 trials since we have 5 folds, and the results are averaged
over them.
Table 4: Mean EERs over all subjects for each classifier and attack dataset for horizontal strokes. Numbers in parentheses
are standard deviations.
(a) Horizontal strokes, random attacks
sa sb sc sd se
C-Baseline-a 0.06(0.0543) 0.06(0.0485) 0.06(0.0472) 0.07(0.0530) 0.07(0.0547)
C-Baseline-b 0.04(0.0461) 0.04(0.0462) 0.05(0.0423) 0.05(0.0447) 0.05(0.0472)
C-Baseline-c 0.07(0.0590) 0.07(0.0518) 0.06(0.0498) 0.06(0.0463) 0.06(0.0541)
C-Baseline-d 0.10(0.0817) 0.09(0.0818) 0.09(0.0742) 0.09(0.0792) 0.09(0.0757)
C-Baseline-e 0.09(0.0891) 0.10(0.0966) 0.10(0.0942) 0.10(0.0973) 0.09(0.0991)
C-ATCA-a 0.04(0.0736) 0.02(0.0534) 0.02(0.0437) 0.01(0.0355) 0.01(0.0291)
C-ATCA-b 0.02(0.0554) 0.04(0.0681) 0.02(0.0572) 0.02(0.0437) 0.02(0.0544)
C-ATCA-c 0.06(0.0782) 0.07(0.0822) 0.08(0.0778) 0.06(0.0634) 0.06(0.0675)
C-ATCA-d 0.06(0.0771) 0.06(0.0823) 0.06(0.0787) 0.09(0.0857) 0.07(0.0811)
C-ATCA-e 0.03(0.0719) 0.04(0.0743) 0.04(0.0703) 0.05(0.0755) 0.06(0.0864)
(b) Horizontal strokes, targeted attacks
sa sb sc sd se
C-Baseline-a 0.50(0.0000) 0.49(0.1142) 0.44(0.1586) 0.38(0.2023) 0.37(0.2051)
C-Baseline-b 0.46(0.1142) 0.50(0.0000) 0.47(0.1388) 0.35(0.1602) 0.35(0.1710)
C-Baseline-c 0.49(0.1442) 0.49(0.1181) 0.50(0.0000) 0.46(0.1397) 0.41(0.1876)
C-Baseline-d 0.43(0.1926) 0.44(0.1866) 0.46(0.1376) 0.50(0.0000) 0.47(0.1129)
C-Baseline-e 0.39(0.2480) 0.40(0.2210) 0.41(0.1852) 0.42(0.1752) 0.50(0.0000)
C-ATCA-a 0.50(0.0000) 0.27(0.1563) 0.23(0.1384) 0.16(0.1684) 0.16(0.1515)
C-ATCA-b 0.33(0.1475) 0.50(0.0000) 0.30(0.1166) 0.25(0.1185) 0.23(0.1437)
C-ATCA-c 0.37(0.1569) 0.35(0.1340) 0.50(0.0000) 0.32(0.1100) 0.35(0.1370)
C-ATCA-d 0.27(0.1390) 0.29(0.1353) 0.33(0.1311) 0.50(0.0000) 0.35(0.1019)
C-ATCA-e 0.21(0.1780) 0.22(0.1729) 0.24(0.1721) 0.25(0.1516) 0.50(0.0000)
6.2.3 Evaluation metrics
Our evaluation metric involves the false-acceptance rate
(FAR), the false rejection rate (FRR), and the mean time T
required to make the first authentication decision in a ses-
sion. FAR is the fraction of strokes of imposters that are
recognized as strokes of the legitimate user by the classifier.
FRR is the fraction of strokes of legitimate users that are
rejected by the classifier. FRR quantifies the empirical prob-
ability that the legitimate user must resort to conventional
authentication mechanisms. Put in a temporal context, if Ts
is the average time between two strokes, then the expected
time after which the legitimate user must type in a password
due to misclassification is FRR−1Ts.
The two error rates FRR and FAR can be traded off
against each other via changing the decision threshold of
the classifier. For instance, at the cost of missing out some
imposters one can reduce FRR by decreasing the threshold.
In order to account for this usability-security trade-off, we
report the equal error rate (EER) in all experiments. This
is the error rate at the threshold where FAR equals FRR.
For a classifier and an attack dataset (e.g., random attacks
using strokes collected in sa, targeted attacks using strokes
collected in sb), we compute an EER using the dataset that
consists of the classifier’s test positive examples (legitimate
strokes) and the attack dataset. Intuitively, EER in our
context measures the degree of separability between touch
strokes of legitimate users and attack strokes.
6.3 Results for classifiers
Table 4 and Table 5 show the mean EERs of our sub-
jects for each classifier and each attack dataset for horizontal
strokes and vertical strokes, respectively.
Diff-setting attacks vs. same-setting attacks: We
call an attack as a same-setting attack if the attack strokes
are collected in the same setting with the one in which the
classifier uses. Otherwise, we call an attack diff-setting at-
tack. For instance, random attacks using strokes collected
in the setting sa to the classifier C-Baseline-a or C-ATCA-a
are same-setting attacks, while random attacks using strokes
collected in the setting sa to the classifier C-Baseline-b or
C-ATCA-b are diff-setting attacks. Moreover, we denote by
RA-xy (or TA-xy) the random attacks (or targeted attacks)
that use strokes collected in the setting sy to the classifier
that uses the setting sx, where x, y ∈ {a, b, c, d, e}.
As we expect, same-setting targeted attacks achieve higher
EERs than diff-setting targeted attacks for both C-Baseline
classifiers and our C-ATCA classifiers. This is because users’
touch behaviors are sensitive. For instance, for horizontal
strokes, EERs of diff-setting targeted attacks are 13%-34%
smaller than those of same-setting targeted attacks for our
C-ATCA classifiers depending on which setting is used to
collect the targeted attacks data.
Moreover, when the difference between the screen setting
used to collect the targeted attacks data and the screen set-
ting of the classifier increases, the EER of the corresponding
diff-setting attacks decreases. For instance, for horizontal
strokes, the EER of the diff-setting targeted attack TA-ea
is 12% smaller than that of the diff-setting targeted attack
TA-ba for our C-ATCA classifiers. Our observations imply
that users’ touch behaviors are more sensitive when the dif-
ferences between screen settings are larger.
C-Baseline vs. C-ATCA: Our classifiers perform signifi-
cantly better than C-Baseline classifiers at defending against
diff-setting attacks. Specifically, EERs of diff-setting ran-
Table 5: Mean EERs over all subjects for each classifier and attack dataset for vertical strokes. Numbers in parentheses are
standard deviations.
(a) Vertical strokes, random attacks
sa sb sc sd se
C-Baseline-a 0.09(0.0873) 0.10(0.0913) 0.11(0.0986) 0.11(0.1024) 0.12(0.1089)
C-Baseline-b 0.08(0.0641) 0.08(0.0652) 0.09(0.0697) 0.10(0.0760) 0.10(0.0867)
C-Baseline-c 0.11(0.0992) 0.12(0.1019) 0.12(0.1032) 0.12(0.1091) 0.13(0.1161)
C-Baseline-d 0.12(0.1019) 0.12(0.0969) 0.12(0.0980) 0.11(0.0936) 0.12(0.1022)
C-Baseline-e 0.15(0.1100) 0.14(0.1046) 0.14(0.1065) 0.14(0.1060) 0.15(0.1158)
C-ATCA-a 0.07(0.0802) 0.05(0.0727) 0.05(0.0697) 0.05(0.0692) 0.07(0.0960)
C-ATCA-b 0.08(0.0698) 0.11(0.0742) 0.09(0.0742) 0.08(0.0766) 0.09(0.0819)
C-ATCA-c 0.08(0.0748) 0.08(0.0785) 0.12(0.0914) 0.09(0.0799) 0.11(0.0899)
C-ATCA-d 0.07(0.0688) 0.08(0.0763) 0.08(0.0759) 0.11(0.0843) 0.10(0.0846)
C-ATCA-e 0.07(0.0702) 0.06(0.0644) 0.07(0.0672) 0.08(0.0728) 0.12(0.0935)
(b) Vertical strokes, targeted attacks
sa sb sc sd se
C-Baseline-a 0.50(0.0000) 0.44(0.0930) 0.42(0.1322) 0.41(0.1587) 0.35(0.1651)
C-Baseline-b 0.48(0.0747) 0.50(0.0000) 0.45(0.1198) 0.42(0.1209) 0.38(0.1289)
C-Baseline-c 0.44(0.1189) 0.44(0.0825) 0.50(0.0000) 0.46(0.1199) 0.41(0.1614)
C-Baseline-d 0.42(0.1345) 0.43(0.0978) 0.46(0.1154) 0.50(0.0000) 0.44(0.0811)
C-Baseline-e 0.44(0.1018) 0.44(0.1122) 0.45(0.0820) 0.47(0.1025) 0.50(0.0000)
C-ATCA-a 0.50(0.0000) 0.26(0.0956) 0.26(0.1264) 0.24(0.1304) 0.23(0.1405)
C-ATCA-b 0.36(0.1200) 0.50(0.0000) 0.30(0.0940) 0.31(0.1167) 0.31(0.1324)
C-ATCA-c 0.33(0.1093) 0.32(0.1048) 0.50(0.0000) 0.31(0.1091) 0.32(0.1282)
C-ATCA-d 0.28(0.0949) 0.31(0.0842) 0.30(0.0986) 0.50(0.0000) 0.31(0.0803)
C-ATCA-e 0.25(0.1091) 0.28(0.0988) 0.30(0.0811) 0.29(0.0914) 0.50(0.0000)
Table 6: Possible attacks to the 7 authentication systems.
Random attacks Targeted attacks
S-Baseline-a max{RA-ay} for y ∈ {a, b, c, d, e} TA-aa
S-Baseline-b max{RA-by} for y ∈ {a, b, c, d, e} TA-bb
S-Baseline-c max{RA-cy} for y ∈ {a, b, c, d, e} TA-cc
S-Baseline-d max{RA-dy} for y ∈ {a, b, c, d, e} TA-dd
S-Baseline-e max{RA-ey} for y ∈ {a, b, c, d, e} TA-ee
S-Baseline-improved RA-xy, where x, y ∈ {a, b, c, d, e} TA-xy, where x, y ∈ {a, b, c, d, e}
S-ATCA RA-xy, where x, y ∈ {a, b, c, d, e} TA-xy, where x, y ∈ {a, b, c, d, e}
dom attacks to our classifiers are 1% to 8% smaller than
those of the C-Baseline classifiers. For instance, with hori-
zontal strokes, the EER of the diff-setting random attacks
RA-ea is 9% for the C-Baseline-e classifier. However, the
EER of RA-ea is 3% for our classifier C-ATCA-e, which
is 6% smaller than the C-Baseline-e classifier. Moreover,
EERs of diff-setting targeted attacks to our classifiers are
6% to 22% smaller than those of the C-Baseline classifiers.
For instance, with horizontal strokes, the EER of the diff-
setting targeted attacks TA-ea is 39% for the C-Baseline-e
classifier. However, the EER of TA-ea is 21% for our classi-
fier C-ATCA-e, which is 18% smaller than the C-Baseline-e
classifier. This is because a user’s touch behaviors in the five
screen settings are both stable and sensitive, which results
in high EERs for the C-Baseline classifiers and explains the
low EERs for our classifiers, respectively.
For same-setting random attacks, the EERs of our clas-
sifiers are slightly larger than those of the C-Baseline clas-
sifiers in some cases. This is because our classifiers in a
setting s use more negative examples other than the strokes
of other users collected in s, which somehow makes their
decision boundaries move towards the strokes of other users
collected in s, and thus same-setting random attacks achieve
slightly higher EERs. As we expect, same-setting targeted
attacks achieve high EERs for all classifiers. Specifically,
EERs of our classifiers and the C-Baseline classifiers are all
close to 50% for same-setting targeted attacks. This means
that, for each stroke, the classifier makes a random decision,
i.e., it accepts or rejects it with the same probability of 0.5.
6.4 Results for authentication systems
We first introduce possible attacks to the considered au-
thentication systems and then show comparison results.
Attacks: Suppose the attacker already knows the set of
settings {sa, sb, sc, sd, se} that could be used by the authen-
tication systems. Moreover, for a targeted user, we assume
the attacker obtains touch strokes of the targeted user or
other users in all the five settings. This means that the
Table 7: Mean EERs over all subjects for each authentica-
tion system and attack for horizontal strokes and vertical
strokes. Numbers in parentheses are standard deviations.
We find that our authentication system achieves significantly
smaller EERs than previous work for both random attacks
and targeted attacks.
(a) Horizontal strokes
Random attacks Targeted attacks
S-Baseline-a 0.08(0.0577) 0.50(0.0000)
S-Baseline-b 0.06(0.0516) 0.50(0.0000)
S-Baseline-c 0.09(0.0616) 0.50(0.0000)
S-Baseline-d 0.11(0.0817) 0.50(0.0000)
S-Baseline-e 0.11(0.0969) 0.50(0.0000)
S-Baseline-improved 0.07(0.0412) 0.44(0.0512)
S-ATCA 0.04(0.0488) 0.32(0.0783)
(b) Vertical strokes
Random attacks Targeted attacks
S-Baseline-a 0.12(0.1067) 0.50(0.0000)
S-Baseline-b 0.11(0.0819) 0.50(0.0000)
S-Baseline-c 0.14(0.1111) 0.50(0.0000)
S-Baseline-d 0.14(0.1051) 0.50(0.0000)
S-Baseline-e 0.17(0.1187) 0.50(0.0000)
S-Baseline-improved 0.12(0.0777) 0.45(0.0364)
S-ATCA 0.08(0.0542) 0.33(0.0502)
attacker can perform targeted attacks or random attacks
using strokes collected in any of the five settings. Recall
that RA-xy (or TA-xy) denotes the random attacks (or tar-
geted attacks) that use strokes collected in the setting sy
to authentication systems that use the setting sx, where
x, y ∈ {a, b, c, d, e}. Note that the attacker does not know
which setting (or classifier) is currently used by our authen-
tication system at a given time point.
To attack the baseline authentication system that uses
the setting sx (i.e., S-Baseline-x), the attacker can choose to
perform the best random attacks (i.e., max{RA -xy} for y ∈
{a, b, c, d, e}) or same-setting targeted attacks (i.e., TA-xx)
that achieve the highest EERs, where x ∈ {a, b, c, d, e}. This
is because the attacker can know the used screen setting.
To attack S-Baseline-improved or S-ATCA, the attacker
does not know the setting of the authentication system1 and
thus it randomly selects a setting and replays strokes col-
lected in the selected setting. As a result, the 25 possible
attacks RA-xy for x, y ∈ {a, b, c, d, e} are performed with an
equal probability of 1
25
in the random attacks, and TA-xy
for x, y ∈ {a, b, c, d, e} are performed with an equal proba-
bility of 1
25
in the targeted attacks. Table 6 summarizes the
possible attacks to different authentication systems.
EER of authentication systems: For an authentication
system and an attack scenario (e.g., random attacks or tar-
geted attacks), we compute an EER via averaging the EERs
of the possible attacks to the authentication system, and
this average EER is used to measure the resilience of the
authentication system to the attacks.
1Note that we assume the attacker cannot access the set-
tings of the authentication system at runtime, because such
access requires high privileges (e.g., root access to the op-
erating system) and an attacker that has already obtained
these high privileges already compromised the device.
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Figure 6: EERs of targeted attacks to our authentication
system as a function of the number of screen settings for
both scenarios and both horizontal and vertical strokes. We
observe that our system can better defend against forgery
attacks with more screen settings.
Results: Table 7 shows the mean EERs over all subjects
for each authentication system and attack scenario for hor-
izontal strokes and vertical strokes.
Overall, we find that our adaptive authentication system
achieves the smallest EERs for both random attacks and tar-
geted attacks. Specifically, the EER of adaptive authentica-
tion system is 2% to 9% smaller than those of the baseline
and improved baseline authentication systems for random
attacks. For targeted attacks, our improved baseline au-
thentication system (i.e., S-Baseline-improved) is 5% to 6%
smaller than that of the baseline authentication systems,
and our adaptive authentication system further decreases
the EER by 12% for both horizontal and vertical strokes.
6.5 Impact of the number of screen settings
We show that the EERs of our authentication system de-
crease when we use more appropriate screen settings. To-
wards this goal, we vary the number of screen settings and
compare the corresponding EERs.
Considering the influence of the difference between two
screen settings, we consider two scenarios, in which the num-
ber of screen settings increases in different fashions. The two
scenarios are:
• Scenario I: The new screen settings are out of the
range that is covered by the existing screen settings.
Specifically, we consider two screen settings consist of
{sa, sb}, three settings consist of {sa, sb, sc}, four set-
tings consist of {sa, sb, sc, sd}, and five settings consist
of {sa, sb, sc, sd, se}.
• Scenario II: The new screen settings are in the range
that is covered by the existing screen settings. Specif-
ically, we consider that two screen settings consist of
{sa, se}, three settings consist of {sa, sc, se}, four set-
tings consist of {sa, sb, sc, se},2 and five settings consist
of {sa, sb, sc, sd, se}.
Since EERs of random attacks are all small, we focus
on targeted attacks. Figure 6 shows EERs of targeted at-
tacks to our system for different number of screen settings.
We observe that our authentication system achieves smaller
EERs as the number of settings increases for both horizon-
tal strokes and vertical strokes and for both scenarios. This
is because, with less screen settings, the performance of our
authentication system is dominated by the same-setting tar-
2We also tried the other four-screen-settings
{sa, sc, sd, se}, and we found that the two four-screen-
settings achieve similar EERs.
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Figure 7: EERs of various attacks as a function of the time spent on collecting training horizontal strokes. The classifier is
C-ATCA-e. EERs of targeted attacks (TA) in the screen setting se are always 0.5, and thus we do not show them in (b) to
better contrast the differences of EERs in other screen settings. We find that learning our classifier is fast, i.e., the EERs are
stable or slightly fluctuate after two minutes (around 30 strokes) spent on collecting training strokes.
geted attacks whose EERs are high. However, with more set-
tings, the impact of same-setting targeted attacks is smaller,
and the performance of our authentication system gets im-
proved. In fact, the probability of same-setting targeted
attacks is 1
n
, where n is the number of settings used.
6.6 Learning our classifiers is fast
To learn our classifiers for a user, we need to collect his/her
touch strokes. To study the effect of time spent on collect-
ing training strokes from a new user on the performance
of our classifiers, we sample a user and one of the five tri-
als/folds. In the selected trial, we keep the test dataset and
attack datasets the same while increasing the positive train-
ing dataset (the negative training dataset is fixed). Figure 7
shows the EERs of various attacks as a function of time
spent on collecting positive training horizontal strokes. The
classifier is C-ATCA-e. EERs of the targeted attacks us-
ing strokes collected in the setting se (i.e., ‘TA, se’) are all
close to 50%, and thus are ignored to better contrast the
differences of other EERs.
We find that EERs converge very fast. In particular, after
2 minutes (around 30 strokes), EERs are stable or slightly
fluctuate. Moreover, after collecting strokes, training a clas-
sifier is finished within 1 second.
6.7 Summary
Our observations can be summarized as follows:
• Users can subconsciously adapt their behavior to dif-
ferent screen settings, i.e., transitions between settings
do not affect user experiences.
• Our authentication mechanism achieves much smaller
EERs than previous work for both random attacks and
targeted attacks.
• Our authentication system achieves smaller EERs with
more screen settings.
• Learning our classifiers is fast, i.e., strokes collected
within two minutes are enough to stabilize EERs.
7. DISCUSSION
Training human attackers: To mimic the targeted user’s
touch behavior, a human attacker needs to be trained to
produce touch strokes whose features are close to those of
the targeted user. We note that Meng et al. [22] proposed an
interactive system to train a human attacker to reproduce
keystroke dynamics of the targeted user for a given short
password. Specifically, they consider features of keystroke
dynamics are constructed from 2-grams, and thus changing
the keystroke timing of a character only influences features
of the local two 2-grams. For instance, suppose we have a
password with three characters ABC, changing the keystroke
timing of B only influences the features of AB and BC. Thus,
it is possible to train a human attacker to reproduce the
keystroke dynamics of a given short password via greedily
changing the keystroke timings of characters one by one.
However, reproducing touch strokes could be much harder
than reproducing keystroke dynamics. This is because 1) we
have around 30 touch features, 2) changing one touch point
could result in changes of a few features, and 3) the human
attacker needs to learn how the targeted user would adapt
to different screen settings. Nevertheless, it is an interest-
ing future work to explore the possibility/impossibility of
training human attackers to mimic a targeted user.
Fixing one screen setting to perform targeted at-
tacks: A robot can keep replaying touch data collected in
a fixed screen setting to attack our authentication system.
The expected number of tries until the robot is using the
correct screen setting would then be the total number of
screen settings. Once the robot gets the correct setting, the
robot can use the mobile device for a time interval during
which the setting is unchanged.
However, this attack can be blocked with a high probabil-
ity by combing our touch-based authentication with PINs.
Specifically, once we detect suspicious touch data, we ask
the user to type in the backup PIN.
Detecting screen settings with specialized intelligent
robots: An intelligent robot that is equipped with spe-
cialized sensors could potentially detect the screen settings
using some Artificial Intelligence (AI) algorithms, and de-
tecting the screen settings could enable the attacker (e.g.,
a friend or spouse of the targeted user) to perform better
targeted attacks. For instance, a robot with a camera could
possibly detect the screen settings by using computer vi-
sion algorithms to compare its raw touch data (collected via
the camera) on the screen and the movements (again, col-
lected via the camera) of the running application. However,
the robot still needs to generate a few touch strokes (these
strokes may be from a screen setting that is different from
the one used by our authentication system) before the screen
setting is detected, during which our authentication scheme
might already successfully reject the attacker. Moreover, it
might not be easy for the attacker to get such a specialized
robot, which is true at least for now, given the current state
of AI. Therefore, we focus on robots that are commercialized
and easy to get.
Leveraging sloppiness and jitter: Screen settings could
also adjust sloppiness and jitter other than the distortions
along the X axis and the Y axis studied in this paper. Slop-
piness controls how far the user has to move the finger on
the screen to send a movement to the applications and jitter
controls what distortions from a straight line on the screen
are still considered as a movement by the applications. It
is an interesting future work to explore the impact of slop-
piness and jitter on the performance of defending against
forgery attacks in our authentication system.
8. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this work, we design a new touch-based continuous au-
thentication system to defend against forgery attacks by
leveraging the impact of screen settings on a user’s touch
behaviors. First, we find that, when screen settings are
discretized properly, a user’s touch behaviors in two differ-
ent settings are both stable and sensitive. Second, based
on these findings, we design a new authentication system
called adaptive touch-based continuous authentication. The
key idea is to randomly sample a predefined screen setting
in each time interval. The attacker cannot know the screen
setting at the time of attacks. Third, we evaluate our sys-
tem by collecting data from 25 subjects in five screen set-
tings. We find that users can subconsciously adapt their
touch behavior to different screen settings, i.e., transitions
between settings do not interrupt users nor affect user expe-
riences. Moreover, we observe that our system significantly
outperforms previous work at defending against both ran-
dom forgery attacks and targeted forgery attacks, the regis-
tration phase of our system takes a short period of time, and
our system can better defend against forgery attacks with
more screen settings.
Future work includes performing a large-scale study about
our authentication system in the wild, investigating more
types of screen settings, and exploring more advanced at-
tacks to touch-based authentication systems.
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